Petitioning for Protection: Without Repeal or Reform of Article 17A, Can Practitioners Maintain Ethical Guardianship Practices While Simultaneously Protecting the Rights of Persons with Intellectual Disabilities by Campigotto, Maria & Hilburn, Brian E.
Fordham Urban Law Journal
Volume 43




Petitioning for Protection: Without Repeal or
Reform of Article 17A, Can Practitioners Maintain
Ethical Guardianship Practices While




Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ulj
This Editorial is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Fordham Urban Law Journal by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more
information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu.
Recommended Citation
Maria Campigotto and Brian E. Hilburn, Petitioning for Protection: Without Repeal or Reform of Article 17A, Can Practitioners Maintain




PETITIONING FOR PROTECTION: WITHOUT 
REPEAL OR REFORM OF ARTICLE 17A, CAN 
PRACTITIONERS MAINTAIN ETHICAL 
GUARDIANSHIP PRACTICES WHILE 
SIMULTANEOUSLY PROTECTING THE 
RIGHTS OF PERSONS WITH INTELLECTUAL 
DISABILITIES? 
Maria Campigotto & Brian E. Hilburn* 
ABSTRACT 
Despite calls for reform of Article 17A guardianships for more 
than twenty-five years, the statute remains unchanged and New York 
routinely subjects adults with intellectual disabilities to open-ended, 
plenary guardianships with few, if any, procedural protections.  As 
non-profit legal service providers working in a medical-legal 
partnership, hospitals refer to our organization, LegalHealth, clients 
who seek Article 17A guardianships over their loved ones.  In this 
Essay, we discuss the many ways in which Article 17A fails to protect 
the rights of our clients’ children, and the ethically compromised 
position practitioners are often put in while trying to both advocate 
for our clients (the Petitioners) and protect the ward (the 
Respondent).  New York has another guardianship statute, Article 
81, that, while not perfect, does a better job of protecting the rights of 
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people with intellectual disabilities.  Contrary to popular belief, 
Article 81 proceedings are not any more onerous than Article 17A 
proceedings.  We suggest that the legislature either repeal Article 
17A, leaving guardianships to proceed under Article 81, or reform 
Article 17A to align with protections afforded in Article 81.  In the 
meantime, we suggest some solutions and practice guidelines that 
practitioners should follow in order to prevent undue violations of the 
civil liberties and due process rights of people with intellectual 
disabilities. 
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 “I love to discover potential in people who aren’t thought to have 
any.” 
  – Oliver Sachs 
INTRODUCTION 
Sarah1 is a twenty-two-year-old woman with intellectual 
disabilities, specifically cerebral palsy.  She needs to have her wisdom 
teeth removed.  Sarah lacks the capacity to provide the requisite 
informed consent her doctors require to administer general 
anesthesia and perform the procedure.  Because she has reached the 
age of majority, her parents no longer have legal authority to consent 
to the procedure on her behalf. 
Charlie is a sixty-year-old man from Belize.  He was found 
confused and disoriented wandering the street.  EMTs were called 
and he was taken to a hospital.  He suffers from advanced dementia.  
He requires help with all of his daily activities and constant 
supervision.  He has no family aside from his sister, a lawful 
permanent resident and single mother of three, who is unable to care 
for him at home.  Due to his immigration status, he is not eligible for 
Medicaid or other state health insurance,2 which would provide either 
a home health attendant or care in a skilled nursing facility.  
Therefore, although he has not required acute medical care in more 
than a year, he remains hospitalized because no safe discharge plan 
can be implemented. 
Both of these patients were referred to LegalHealth, a medical-
legal partnership providing free legal services to low-income patients 
                                                                                                                 
 1. The names of Sarah and all other clients or patients of LegalHealth discussed 
in this Essay have been changed to protect their privacy. 
 2. See generally N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF HEALTH, DOCUMENTATION GUIDE, 
CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRANT ELIGIBILITY FOR HEALTH COVERAGE IN NEW YORK 
STATE (2008), https://www.health.ny.gov/health_care/medicaid/publications/docs/
gis/08ma009att.pdf [https://perma.cc/G6PY-C4UC]; N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF HEALTH, 
ADMIN. DIRECTIVE 4 (2004), http://www.health.ny.gov/health_care/medicaid/
publications/docs/adm/04adm-7.pdf [https://perma.cc/77M9-ZD73]. 
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at over twenty-five hospitals and clinics throughout New York City 
and Long Island.3  When LegalHealth’s partner organizations 
recognize that a patient has a legal issue, the medical providers refer 
their patient to LegalHealth onsite at the hospital or clinic.  
LegalHealth’s mission is to improve the health and quality of life for 
low-income New Yorkers with serious health conditions by 
addressing the social determinants that affect health.4  For example, 
helping a diabetic man obtain food stamps will increase his ability to 
comply with his prescribed diet.  By assisting the mother of an 
asthmatic child living in a mold-infested apartment obtain adequate 
repairs from the landlord, LegalHealth can improve the child’s health, 
decrease her need for inhaled steroids or other medications with 
potentially harmful side effects, and reduce ER visits, school 
absences, and instances where our client must call off from work to 
care for her sick child. 
Unsurprisingly, a significant number of referrals to LegalHealth 
are for family members of mentally “incapacitated” adults like 
Charlie and Sarah.5  Although both of these families are seeking adult 
guardianships, or the ability to make decisions on behalf of their 
mentally incapacitated loved one, the legal process for each is quite 
different.  As we will discuss, the legal protections and due process 
rights afforded to these incapacitated adults are significantly different 
as well. 
Article 17A of the Surrogate’s Court Procedure Act (Article 17A) 
and Article 81 of the Mental Hygiene Law (Article 81) govern the 
appointment of guardians in New York.6  Article 17A is used to 
obtain guardianship over a mentally retarded or developmentally 
disabled person whose mental incapacity occurred before the ward 
obtained the age of twenty-two-years-old, such as Sarah.7  Article 81 
applies to any other situation.8  Since Charlie’s “incapacity” is not the 
result of mental retardation or developmental disability and occurred 
                                                                                                                 
 3. See LEGALHEALTH, www.legalhealth.org [https://perma.cc/L7JJ-E5NR]. 
 4. About LegalHealth, LEGALHEALTH, http://legalhealth.org/about-us 
[https://perma.cc/XK7X-YYN6]. 
 5. LegalHealth was referred sixty-nine, eighty-four, and ninety-four matters 
relating to adult guardianship for the years 2013, 2014, and 2015, respectively.  
 6. See N.Y. SURR. CT. PROC. ACT LAW §§ 1750–61 (McKinney 2016); N.Y. 
MENTAL HYG. LAW §§ 81.01–81.44 (McKinney 2016). 
 7. See C. Raymond Radigan & Jennifer F. Hillman, Article 17-A Proceedings 
Remain an Important Tool, N.Y. L.J., Jan. 6, 2010, http://rmfpc.com/wp-
content/uploads/2012/10/Article-17-A-Proceedings-Remain-Impt-Tool-CRR-JFH-
1.10.pdf [https://perma.cc/JNM4-4BDM]. 
 8. See N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 81.01 (McKinney 2016). 
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well after his twenty-second birthday, an Article 81 guardianship 
would be used for Charlie. 
Compared to Article 17A, Article 81 provides many more 
procedural protections designed to prevent abuse and preserve an 
alleged incapacitated person’s autonomy.  One of the problems with 
Article 81, however, is that there are very few, if any, organizations 
providing free representation to petitioners in Article 81 proceedings.  
Non-profit legal service organizations do not assist low-income New 
Yorkers to pursue Article 81 guardianships, at least in part, because 
these organizations believe that the expense and time requirements 
are beyond their resources.  Article 17A guardianships were designed 
to be an easy and accelerated process for parents who need to 
maintain a continuity of authority over the legal and medical needs of 
their children with mental disabilities.9  Unfortunately, Article 17A 
sacrifices procedural protections and respect for autonomy for speed 
and convenience. 
Both Charlie and Sarah’s families are seeking similar remedies for 
similar problems: the legal authority to consent to necessary medical 
care (in the case of Sarah) or legal representation to pursue 
immigration remedies that will lead to Medicaid eligibility (in the case 
of Charlie).  Both Charlie and Sarah are facing significant legal 
consequences, namely the loss of some or all of their autonomy, and 
what some have described as a “civil death.”10  Why should the 
protections put in place to protect Charlie’s autonomy under Article 
81 not also be available to Sarah under Article 17A?  Is it not 
arbitrary to make such determinations based solely upon the 
underlying cause of their intellectual disability?  We believe that it is. 
LegalHealth handles many Article 17A guardianship 
proceedings.11  In addition, LegalHealth has partnerships with several 
law firms in New York City that represent LegalHealth clients on a 
pro bono basis under its guidance and supervision.  Our mission is to 
improve the lives of medically vulnerable low-income New Yorkers 
by addressing their non-medical needs.12  For guardianships, our 
mission is to improve the lives of the patients alleged to be 
                                                                                                                 
 9. Rose Mary Bailly & Charis B. Nick-Torok, Should We Be 
Talking?Beginning a Dialogue on Guardianship for the Developmentally Disabled 
in New York, 75 ALB. L. REV. 807, 818 (2012). 
 10. See Joseph A. Rosenberg, Routine Violations of Medical Privacy in Article 81 
Guardianship Cases: So What or Now What?, 85 N.Y. ST. B. ASS’N J. 34, 37 (2013). 
 11. LegalHealth opened 112 cases for Article 17A guardianship from 2013 to 
2015.  
 12. About LegalHealth, supra note 4. 
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incapacitated.13  Sarah needs a medical procedure that she cannot get 
without a guardian.  Charlie needs representation to address an 
immigration matter that might lead to Medicaid eligibility, but cannot 
understand the possible risks and benefits of various immigration 
options, nor consent to an attorney-client relationship.  Theoretically, 
both Sarah and Charlie’s situation would improve with the 
appointment of a guardian.  However, neither Sarah nor Charlie 
would be LegalHealth clients during the guardianship process.  
Instead, their family members would be LegalHealth clients.  As 
attorneys, we are professionally and ethically required to represent 
the interests of our clients, which may be in direct conflict with the 
interests of their family member with intellectual disabilities. 
As legal practitioners serving low-income clients, we find the 
current statutory framework extremely problematic.  We are troubled 
by the lack of procedural protections provided by Article 17A and the 
potential for people with intellectual disabilities to be disenfranchised 
by a guardianship system that does not recognize their unique 
abilities and limitations.  Under these circumstances, representing the 
families of individuals with intellectual disabilities in Article 17A 
guardianship proceeding gives us pause.  Because Article 81 
guardianship proceedings are available and afford numerous 
procedural protections, the continued use of Article 17A without 
major changes makes little sense.  Article 17A practitioners can both 
learn and borrow from the protections afforded under Article 81. 
Part I of this Essay discusses the legislative history of Article 17A 
and the evolution of society’s treatment of people with intellectual 
disabilities.  Part II, discusses the ways in which Article 17A fails to 
protect the rights of people with intellectual disabilities.  Part III 
argues that Article 17A does not live up to its original purpose: to 
reduce the costs and complications involved in guardianship 
proceedings.  In practice, it is not significantly less onerous than 
Article 81 guardianship proceedings.  In Part IV, we recommend 
policy reforms aimed at correcting Article 17A’s deficiencies.  Finally, 
given that policy reform may take many years, this Essay makes 
recommendations for practitioners currently representing clients in 
Article 17A proceedings to affirmatively protect the constitutional 
rights of wards while we wait for policy reform. 
                                                                                                                 
 13. About LegalHealth, supra note 4. 
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I.  BACKGROUND 
Article 17A of the Surrogate’s Court Procedure Act is an outdated 
law that reflects an antiquated understanding of intellectual 
disabilities.  To understand Article 17A’s deficiencies, it is first 
necessary to put the statute into its historical context. 
In many ancient societies, people with disabilities were believed to 
be possessed by evil spirits.14  As a result, they were often killed or 
abandoned.15  By the early twentieth-century, medicine had replaced 
religion as the main authority influencing treatment of people with 
intellectual disabilities.16  During this time, it was believed that people 
with intellectual disabilities suffered “from a hereditary, incurable 
disease that led to criminality, immorality or depraved behavior, and 
pauperism, all of which constituted an unacceptable drain on 
society.”17  People with intellectual disabilities were isolated from the 
rest of society and abandoned to the notoriously poor conditions of 
asylums and poor houses.18  Believed to be genetically inferior and at 
risk of contaminating the gene pool, people with intellectual 
disabilities were even subjected to forced sterilization as part of the 
eugenics movement in the early twentieth-century.19 
By the mid-twentieth century, however, society’s understanding of 
people with intellectual disabilities began to shift.  During the 1960s, 
parents and advocates for people with disabilities made a push toward 
                                                                                                                 
 14. GEORGE HENDERSON & WILLIE V. BRYAN, PSYCHOSOCIAL ASPECTS OF 
DISABILITY 18 (4th ed. 2011). 
 15. Id. at 18–19. 
 16. See Kristin Booth Glen, Changing Paradigms: Mental Capacity, Legal 
Capacity, Guardianship, and Beyond, 44 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 93, 104 (2012). 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id.  In 1924, the Commonwealth of Virginia passed a law, modeled on the 
model eugenics law designed by Harry Laughlin, which provided for compulsory 
sterilizations of individuals found to be “feebleminded, insane, depressed, mentally 
handicapped, epileptic and other.” Down Syndrome Human and Civil Rights 
Timeline, GLOBAL DOWN SYNDROME FOUND., http://www.globaldownsyndrome.org/
about-down-syndrome/history-of-down-syndrome/down-syndrome-human-and-civil-
rights-timeline [https://perma.cc/T4TP-E3Z8].  The law was challenged on 
constitutional grounds and upheld by the Supreme Court in 1927. See Buck v. Bell, 
274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927).  Writing for the majority, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, 
Jr. ruled that forced sterilization was not a violation of the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment but necessary “in order to prevent our being swamped with 
incompetence.  It is better for all the world if, instead of waiting to execute 
degenerate offspring for crime or to let them starve for their imbecility, society can 
prevent those who are manifestly unfit from continuing their kind.” Id. 
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deinstitutionalization,20 and there was a realization that people with 
disabilities deserved basic human rights.21  However, at this time, 
society made little effort to understand someone with an intellectual 
disability beyond their diagnosis, and guardianship statutes enacted 
during this time (such as Article 17A)22 were a “medicalized, 
diagnosis-driven, rights-depriving paradigm of guardianship, justified 
by the alleged protective benefits of parens patriae.”23 
Another great shift in society’s treatment of people with 
intellectual disabilities started during the 1980s and, arguably, 
continues today.  Society began to understand that people with 
intellectual disabilities are unique individuals with unique needs and 
abilities who have an equal right to self-determination as the 
nondisabled.24  The ideal, according to this shift, is inclusion and 
preservation of independence.25 
Accompanying this shift in understanding intellectual disabilities, 
the 1980s saw a wave of guardianship reforms.  Many of these reforms 
were partly inspired by an Associated Press (AP) report titled 
Guardians of the Elderly: An Ailing System, which “exposed 
widespread neglect and malfeasance in the guardianship process 
throughout the country.”26  In 1988, the American Bar Association 
held a National Guardianship Symposium that addressed the need for 
reforms to “produce a guardianship system . . . more fair, just and 
responsive to the needs of the wards.”27  In particular, the New York 
State Law Revision Committee reviewed Articles 77 and 78 of the 
Mental Hygiene Law and recommend reforms.28  Ultimately, the 
legislature repealed Articles 77 and 78 because they provided for an 
                                                                                                                 
 20. See Glen, supra note 16, at 128 (citing Ruth Colker, The Disability Integration 
Presumption: Thirty Years Later, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 789, 789–90 (2006)). 
 21. See Glen, supra note 16, at 131–32. 
 22. Bailly & Nick-Torok, supra note 9, at 818. 
 23. Glen, supra note 16, at 106. 
 24. See id. at 128–29. 
 25. See id. 
 26. THE GUARDIANSHIP CLINIC, GUARDIANSHIP IN NEW YORK: DEVELOPING AN 
AGENDA FOR CHANGE 48 n.1 (2012), https://www.cardozo.yu.edu/sites/default/
files/GuardianshipReport.pdf [https://perma.cc/PN65-Y8YH]. 
 27. Id. (citing A.B.A., GUARDIANSHIP: AN AGENDA FOR REFORM: 
RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE NATIONAL GUARDIANSHIP SYMPOSIUM AND POLICY OF 
THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION iv (1989), http://www.americanbar.org/content/
dam/aba/administrative/law_aging/2011/2011_aging_gship_agda_refrm.authcheckdam
.pdf [https://perma.cc/H7J5-KF8L]). 
 28. Julie M. Solinski, Guardianship Proceedings in New York: Proposals for 
Article 81 to Address Both the Lack of Funding and Resource Problems, 17 PACE L. 
REV. 444, 450 (1997). 
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outdated “conservator-by-committee” form of guardianship.29  In its 
place, the legislature enacted Article 81 of the Mental Hygiene Law, 
which took effect in 1993.30 
Article 81 requires limited, tailored guardianships to meet the 
specific needs of each allegedly incapacitated person (AIP).31  The 
Legislative Findings and Purpose of Article 81 are highly illustrative 
of the changing mindsets of that time: 
The legislature hereby finds that the needs of persons with 
incapacities are as diverse and complex as they are unique to the 
individual.  The current system of conservatorship and committee 
does not provide the necessary flexibility to meet these needs.  
Conservatorship which traditionally compromises a person’s rights 
only with respect to property frequently is insufficient to provide 
necessary relief.  On the other hand, a committee, with its judicial 
finding of incompetence and the accompanying stigma and loss of 
civil rights, traditionally involves a deprivation that is often excessive 
and unnecessary.  Moreover, certain persons require some form of 
assistance in meeting their personal and property management 
needs but do not require either of these drastic remedies.  The 
legislature finds that it is desirable for and beneficial to persons with 
incapacities to make available to them the least restrictive form of 
intervention which assists them in meeting their needs but, at the 
same time, permits them to exercise the independence and self-
determination of which they are capable.  The legislature declares 
that it is the purpose of this act to promote the public welfare by 
establishing a guardianship system which is appropriate to satisfy 
either personal or property management needs of an incapacitated 
person in a manner tailored to the individual needs of that person, 
which takes in account the personal wishes, preferences and desires 
of the person, and which affords the person the greatest amount of 
independence and self-determination and participation in all the 
decisions affecting such person’s life.32 
                                                                                                                 
 29. See N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 81.01 (McKinney 2016). 
 30. Solinski, supra note 28, at 450. 
 31. N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW §§ 81.01–81.44 (referring to the individual for whom 
the guardianship is sought as a person with alleged incapacities, commonly referred 
to as AIP). But see N.Y. SURR. CT. PROC. ACT LAW §§ 1750–61 (McKinney 2016) 
(referring to the individual as a “mentally retarded or developmentally disabled 
person,” while case law and common practice, as discussed throughout his article, 
refer to the individual as a “ward” in Article 17A proceedings).  We use “ward” 
throughout this essay when referring to individuals with intellectual disabilities in 
Article 17A proceedings and “AIP” when discussing them in the context of Article 
81. 
 32. N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 81.01 (McKinney 2016). 
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The legislature set forth similar policies when it reviewed Article 
17A in 1990: 
[S]ince [Article 17A] was enacted in 1969, momentous changes have 
occurred in the care, treatment and understanding of [intellectually 
disabled] individuals.  Deinstitutionalization and community-based 
care have increased the capacity of persons with mental retardation 
and developmental disabilities to function independently and make 
many of their own decisions.  These are rights and activities which 
society has increasingly come to recognize should be exercised by 
such persons to the fullest extent possible.  While guardians 
appointed pursuant to article 17–A of the Surrogate Court 
Procedure Act must have the authority to make decisions to ensure 
the ward’s best interest, such decision-making authority by the 
guardian should not infringe on the right of the ward to make 
decisions when he or she is capable.  The legislature also notes that 
there exists a national consensus that guardianship, for all persons, 
should be subject to review.33 
 Twenty-five years later, there have inexplicably been no changes to 
Article 17A.  Nevertheless, New York courts have found that “the 
need for reconsideration of our scheme for guardianship of persons 
with mental retardation and developmental disabilities is greater than 
ever.”34 
Society’s evolving understanding of people with intellectual 
disabilities is reflected in the laws governing their care.  Through the 
mid-twentieth century, lawmakers were primarily concerned with 
protecting the public from people with intellectual disabilities.  By the 
time Article 17A was adopted in 1969, society’s objective had 
switched to a policy of protecting people with intellectual disabilities 
from themselves, a paternalistic approach.  Arguably, Article 81 is 
equally paternalistic because it also substitutes a person’s decision-
making authority for that of a guardian.  Many scholars and disability 
rights activists argue that to truly protect the rights of people with 
intellectual disabilities, society must depart from this “substituted-
decision making” model and adopt a “supported-decision making” 
                                                                                                                 
 33. In re Chaim A.K., 26 Misc. 3d 837, 838 n.1 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 2009). 
 34. In re Mark C.H., 28 Misc. 3d 765, 769–70 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 2010). 
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model.35  Several jurisdictions around the world have already started 
experimenting with this approach.36 
In the meantime, however, practitioners in New York have only 
Article 17A and Article 81 to choose from.  In Part II, this Essay 
discusses the shortcomings of Article 17A, and how to solve, or at 
least mitigate, them with the more modern approach of Article 81. 
II.  ARTICLE 17A’S CENTRAL FLAW IS ITS ADOPTION OF A 
DIAGNOSIS-DRIVEN APPROACH TO PEOPLE WITH INTELLECTUAL 
DISABILITIES, RESULTING IN THE UNCONSTITUTIONAL DENIAL OF 
PROCEDURAL PROTECTIONS THROUGHOUT THE GUARDIANSHIP 
PROCESS 
Article 17A is a “diagnosis-driven” statute because it equates a 
diagnosis of mental retardation or developmental delay with 
incompetence.37  Article 17A allows a court to determine that a 
person is incapacitated and in need of a guardian based solely on the 
person’s medical diagnosis.38  Under Article 17A, a person is 
“mentally retarded” if at least two licensed physicians (or one 
licensed physician and one licensed psychologist), with appropriate 
experience treating persons with intellectual disabilities, certify that 
the person is incapable of managing him or herself and/or his or her 
affairs by reason of mental retardation39 or developmental 
                                                                                                                 
 35. See, e.g., Leslie Salzman, Rethinking Guardianship (Again): Substituted 
Decision Making as a Violation of the Integration Mandate of Title II of the 
Americans with Disabilities Act, 81 U. COLO. L. REV. 157 (2010); see also Glen, 
supra note 16, at 115. 
 36. Glen, supra note 16, at 139–53 (discussing “a number of models that provide 
for supported decision-making, that reserve substituted decision-making for the most 
extreme cases of incapacity and that change the very definitions of capacity and 
incapacity” in jurisdictions including Sweden, Germany, Russia, and Canada). 
 37. See N.Y. SURR. CT. PROC. ACT LAW § 1750-a (McKinney 2016). 
 38. See id.; id. § 1750 (“When it shall appear to the satisfaction of the court that a 
person is a mentally retarded [or developmentally disabled] person, the court is 
authorized to appoint a guardian of the person or of the property or of both if such 
appointment of a guardian or guardians is in the best interest of the mentally 
retarded [or developmentally disabled] person.”). 
 39. Id. § 1750(1). 
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disability,40 and that the condition is permanent or likely to continue 
indefinitely.41   
In modern society, it is inappropriate to define someone in terms of 
their medical diagnosis.  A medical diagnosis alone does not provide 
adequate information regarding a person’s functional abilities and 
limitations.  Consider our client Emily.  Emily is a thirty-eight-year-
old woman who was first referred to LegalHealth for advice about her 
Medicaid eligibility.  She was unable to attend an appointment at the 
medical clinic due to a scheduling conflict, so her first contact with a 
LegalHealth attorney was a telephone conversation.  During that 
conversation, Emily struck the LegalHealth attorney as someone who 
is a good advocate for herself. 
When the attorney met Emily face-to-face at a follow up 
appointment, the attorney discovered that Emily has Down 
Syndrome.  Most people are familiar with some of the distinctive 
facial features common to people with Down Syndrome,42 facial 
features which often result in a label of “mentally retarded” for their 
wearers.  It is true that Down Syndrome also affects cognitive 
development.43  However, the severity of the cognitive delays 
experienced by people with Down Syndrome vary significantly from 
person to person and are usually characterized as “mild” to 
“moderate.”44 
Emily lives independently, holds a job, takes public transportation 
unaccompanied, and pays her own bills every month from her own 
checking account.  Emily’s diagnosis does not, in any way, describe 
Emily’s unique abilities and limitations, nor prove that she is unable 
to handle her own affairs, which she already does.  Yet, if Emily’s 
parents sought to be appointed as her guardians through Article 17A, 
New York courts would not be required to consider anything beyond 
her physicians’ certification of her diagnosis. 
                                                                                                                 
 40. Id. § 1750-a(1).  The statute allows that the developmental disability may be 
attributable to cerebral palsy, epilepsy, neurological impairment, autism, traumatic 
head injury, dyslexia, or “any other condition found to be closely related to mental 
retardation because such condition results in similar impairment of general 
intellectual functioning or adaptive behavior to that of mentally retarded persons.” 
Id. 
 41. Id. §§ 1750, 1750-a. 
 42. See Facts about Down Syndrome, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & 
PREVENTION (Mar. 3, 2016), http://www.cdc.gov/ncbddd/birthdefects/
DownSyndrome.html [https://perma.cc/WF3J-KBGG]. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. 
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In contrast, Article 81 directs the court to assess the decision-
making capacity and functional limitations of the alleged 
incapacitated person,45 rather than focus on any underlying medical 
condition.  To determine whether a person is incapacitated, the court 
must find by “clear and convincing evidence”46 that she or he is both 
(1) unable to care for her personal needs and/or property, and (2) 
cannot adequately understand and appreciate the nature and 
consequences of such inability.47  In making this determination, the 
court must give “primary consideration” to the person’s “functional 
level and functional limitations.”48  Although the court may assess a 
person’s illness and mental disability,49 the statute does not require 
supporting papers to contain medical information.  Furthermore, the 
court’s assessment of mental illness or mental disability must focus on 
the way such medical condition affects the AIP’s behavior, cognition, 
and judgment.50 
To be clear, Article 17A does not allow the court to appoint a 
guardian after merely determining that a person is mentally retarded 
or developmentally disabled, but also requires the court to determine 
that the person is incapable of managing herself and/or her personal 
affairs by reason of her mental retardation or developmental 
disability.51  However, very little attention is given to a person’s actual 
abilities, behavior, and judgment.  Rather, Article 17A, reflecting the 
attitudes of society at the time it was adopted, takes for granted that a 
person who is diagnosed as mentally retarded or developmentally 
disabled must also be incapable of handling herself and/or her affairs.  
As we have seen with Emily and others like her, many people with a 
diagnosis of mental retardation or developmental disability are fully 
capable of handling themselves and their affairs.  Before determining 
that a person is in need of a guardian, Article 81 requires the court to 
consider the person as a whole and make a nuanced analysis, linking 
functional incapacity, inability to understand or appreciate their 
incapacity, and the likelihood that the person will suffer harm as a 
result.52  In contrast, Article 17A allows the court to make this 
                                                                                                                 
 45. N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 81.02(c) (McKinney 2016). 
 46. Id. § 81.12. 
 47. Id. § 81.02(b). 
 48. Id. § 81.02(c). 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
 51. N.Y. SURR. CT. PROC. ACT LAW § 1750-a (McKinney 2016). 
 52. N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 81.15(b) (McKinney 2016). 
882 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XLIII 
decision after two physicians have checked a box on forms provided 
by the court.53 
In practice, many judges recognize the insufficiency of Article 17A 
evidentiary requirements.  These judges also routinely require those 
seeking guardianships to supply, in addition to the statements of two 
physicians, a comprehensive psychological or psychosocial evaluation.  
Such an evaluation typically includes a description of the person’s 
living arrangements, the extent to which she can independently 
perform the activities of daily living, her ability to communicate, a 
description of any physical frailties or limitations, and her interests 
and how she enjoys spending her time.  However, the statute itself 
requires nothing more than the two physicians’ certifications, which 
may have been completed by a physician who has met the person only 
once and for the purpose of completing the form.  It may be possible 
to diagnose someone as mentally retarded or developmentally 
disabled during one brief appointment, but it is not always possible to 
comprehensively assess her ability to manage herself and/or her own 
affairs.  There is no guarantee that the physician completing the form 
has any knowledge of the ward’s daily routines, degree of 
independence, or functional capabilities. 
Emily has been diagnosed “mentally retarded,” but she is far from 
incompetent.  If Emily’s family seeks Article 17A guardianship, it is 
possible that the court would never learn how well she independently 
manages her own affairs.54  By focusing so much on the diagnosis of 
persons with intellectual disabilities, Article 17A fails to protect the 
ward at every step of the appointment process.  From this flawed 
premise underlying Article 17A flows a cascade of potential civil 
rights and due process concerns. 
                                                                                                                 
 53. N.Y. SURR. CT. PROC. ACT §§ 1750, 1750-a (McKinney 2016) (stating the 
requirement of two physicians’ certifications and the standardized form provided by 
the chief administrator of courts pursuant to Section 1752); see also AFFIDAVIT 
(CERTIFICATION) OF EXAMINING PHYSICIAN OR LICENSED PSYCHOLOGIST 1–4 (2016), 
http://www.nycourts.gov/forms/surrogates/omni/gd17A.pdf [https://perma.cc/3XKG-
NAKZ]. 
 54. However, as illustrated in In re Chaim A.K., the court must serve as the 
gatekeeper in only allowing a 17A guardianship where the individual is mentally 
retarded and developmentally disabled as defined by statute. 26 Misc. 3d 837, 849–50 
(N.Y. Sur. Ct. 2009).  If the individual does not meet those criteria, an alternative 
route often must be taken. See Radigan & Hillman, supra note 7. 
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A. Article 17A Fails to Protect People with Intellectual Disabilities 
by Applying an Unduly Restrictive One-Size Fits All Approach to 
Guardianship 
The only type of guardianship considered by Article 17A is plenary 
in scope and indefinite in duration.  Article 17A allows the petitioner 
to seek guardianship over the person, their property, or both.55  The 
statute also requires that the court consider and separately determine 
the person’s ability to make health care decisions.56  However, if the 
court determines that a person is able to make their own health care 
decisions, nothing precludes the court from appointing a guardian to 
make all other decisions.57  In practice, LegalHealth has never seen a 
case in which a court appointed a guardian but left the ward’s legal 
right to make his or her own health care decisions intact.  Article 17A 
provides no other distinction or qualification to limit the guardian’s 
power. 
Article 17A’s plenary model of guardianship can be attributed to 
its outdated diagnosis-driven approach.  Based on a framework laid 
out by Article 17A, one might conclude that its drafters assumed that 
a person is incompetent based on their medical diagnosis, and further 
assumed that she must be incompetent in all domains.58  In contrast, 
Article 81 recognizes that a person may be limited in some domains, 
but retain full functional and decision-making capacity in others.59  
Article 81’s text reflects a more sophisticated understanding of 
intellectual disabilities, noting “that the needs of persons with 
incapacities are as diverse and complex as they are unique to the 
individual.”60  Article 81, therefore, mandates that guardianship 
should take a form that is “the least restrictive form of intervention 
which assists [the incapacitated person] in meeting their needs, but at 
the same time, permits them to exercise the independence and self-
determination of which they are capable,” and which is “tailored to 
the individual needs of the person, which takes into account the 
personal wishes, preferences and desires of the person, and which 
affords the person the greatest amount of independence and self-
determination and participation in all the decisions affecting such 
person’s life.”61 
                                                                                                                 
 55. N.Y. SURR. CT. PROC. ACT § 1750-a (McKinney 2016). 
 56. Id. § 1750. 
 57. See id. 
 58. See N.Y. SURR. CT. PROC. ACT §§ 1750, 1750-a (McKinney 2016). 
 59. See N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW §§ 81.01, 81.29(a) (McKinney 2016). 
 60. Id. § 81.01. 
 61. Id. 
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David is a twenty-year-old man with “developmental disabilities.”62  
His primary care physician describes David as having the intellectual 
capacity of a ten-year-old and referred his mother to LegalHealth.  
He suggested that his mother seek an Article 17A guardianship.  With 
forms in hand already completed by his doctors, David’s mother 
sought plenary guardianship over David.  It is important to note, 
however, that someone with the intellectual capabilities of a ten-year-
old can reasonably be expected to make some decisions 
independently.  Yet Article 17A does not require the court to 
determine which affairs David could competently handle himself.  
Furthermore, Article 17A does not consider David’s appreciation and 
understanding of his own limitations. 
In fact, when the LegalHealth attorney met with David, she 
recognized that David may have had some learning disabilities that 
affected his education, but he was nevertheless competent to form an 
attorney-client relationship.  She also recognized that he was 
competent to form valid, rational opinions about matters affecting his 
own life.  David admitted difficulty navigating government 
bureaucracies, completing paperwork, as well as understanding and 
responding to requests from various agencies.  He stated that he relies 
on his mother for assistance and that he trusts her to act in his best 
interest.  Rather than pursue an Article 17A guardianship, 
LegalHealth assisted David to execute a power of attorney63 and 
health care proxy,64 appointing his mother as his agent. 
Now, David’s mother is able to handle many of David’s affairs on 
his behalf, but she is doing so with his full consent.  His personal 
liberty and autonomy remain intact.  If David decides to appoint a 
different person to manage his affairs in the future, he can revoke the 
power of attorney.  Most importantly, David is young and may still be 
able to learn the skills necessary to manage more of his own affairs in 
the future.  Once Article 17A guardianship papers are issued, 
however, there is no further contact from the court; thus, dismantling 
                                                                                                                 
 62. “Developmental disabilities are a group of conditions due to an impairment in 
physical, learning, language, or behavior areas.  These conditions begin during the 
developmental period, may impact day-to-day functioning, and usually last 
throughout a person’s lifetime.” Facts about Developmental Disabilities, CTRS. FOR 
DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (Sept. 22, 2015), http://www.cdc.gov/
ncbddd/developmentaldisabilities/facts.html [https://perma.cc/XFQ3-GFPR]. 
 63. A power of attorney is “a written document . . . by which a principal with 
capacity designates an agent to act on his or her behalf.” N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-
1501(2)(j) (McKinney 2016). 
 64. A health care proxy is a legal document in which a principal with capacity may 
delegate the authority to make health care decisions to an agent in the event the 
principal later loses capacity. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW§ § 2981 (McKinney 2016). 
2016] PETITIONING FOR PROTECTION 885 
the guardianship would require David to initiate new proceedings on 
his own.  Being locked into a plenary, open-ended guardianship 
would be unduly restrictive for David. 
B. Article 17A Violates the Ward’s Right to Due Process by Failing 
to Ensure Her Right to Participate in the Guardianship Proceeding 
Article 17A fails to protect the respondent’s right to participate in 
the guardianship process.  Although the respondent has the right to 
request an attorney,65 many respondents are not adequately informed 
about the nature of the proceeding and its potentially significant 
consequences.  Needless to say, a lawyer is rarely requested.  If the 
ward is a person so disabled that the court can determine she is in 
need of a guardian for life pursuant to Article 17A, then surely she 
should also be appointed a guardian ad litem (GAL) to protect her 
interests during the guardianship proceeding.  Although some judges 
do appoint a GAL to represent the ward in an Article 17A 
proceeding, it is not required by statute and, in our experience, is 
seldom done. 
Consequently, respondents with intellectual disabilities go without 
advocates in the courtroom.  Consider the case of David discussed 
above.66  Although David may possibly have the intellectual 
capabilities of a ten-year-old child, a ten-year-old child is certainly 
capable of having some valid and legitimate opinions concerning his 
living arrangements, social associations, medical treatment, and how 
his resources are spent.  Indeed, children are always appointed a 
lawyer in Family Court proceedings when custody or guardianship 
arrangements are being decided.67  The child’s lawyer must regularly 
consult and advise the child in a manner consistent with the child’s 
capacities throughout the course of the proceedings.68  Lawyers are 
further instructed to ascertain the child’s position and advocate 
                                                                                                                 
 65. N.Y. SURR. CT. PROC. ACT LAW 401 (McKinney 2016) (stating that competent 
adults can appear by their attorney), § 407(b) (stating that the court has discretion to 
appoint an attorney for indigent persons).  However Sections 402(2) and 403(b) 
provide that the court may appoint a guardian ad litem in its discretion for a person 
“under disability.” Id. §§ 402(2), 403(2). 
 66. See discussion supra Part II.A. 
 67. N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 249 (McKinney 2016). 
 68. See N.Y. STATE SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIV., FOURTH DEP’T, ETHICS 
FOR ATTORNEYS FOR CHILDREN (2016), https://www.nycourts.gov/courts/
ad4/AFC/AFC-ethics.pdf [https://perma.cc/SZX4-9FCU] (containing Section 7.2 of 
the Rules of the Chief Judge). 
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zealously according to the child’s wishes, even when the lawyer 
believes the child’s preferences are not in the child’s best interests.69 
The concerns that motivate this requirement in Family Court also 
exist in adult guardianship proceedings.  David and all other adults 
with intellectual disabilities should have someone to advise them and 
to help them articulate their preferences and desires in proceedings 
that impact their personal autonomy and decision-making authority.  
It is not right that Article 17A often allows guardianship papers to be 
granted without representation for the subject of the proceeding. 
Article 81 also provides that the AIP has the right to court 
appointed counsel if requested.70  In the event that the AIP does not 
request counsel, however, Article 81 provides a safeguard to ensure 
that the court does not only consider information submitted by a 
party with adverse interests to the AIP.  Article 81 requires the 
appointment of a court evaluator at the commencement of every 
proceeding.71  A court evaluator does not represent the AIP.  Rather, 
court evaluators are neutral agents of the court tasked with 
investigating the AIP’s functional level and limitations and making a 
formal written recommendation to the court regarding whether 
intervention is needed, the least restrictive form of intervention, and 
the appropriateness of the proposed guardian.72  At a minimum, the 
court evaluator must meet, interview, and consult with the AIP, 
explain the proceeding and consequences in a language and manner 
that the AIP understands, inquire whether the AIP wants or needs an 
attorney, consult with any experts having specialized knowledge in 
the area of the alleged incapacity, interview the petitioner, and 
investigate any conflicts of interest that the petitioner may have in 
seeking guardianship.73 
A recent LegalHealth experience illustrates the perilous 
consequences of Article 17A’s reliance on the good intentions of 
petitioners and the corresponding lack of protections for the 
respondents.  John is a fifty-eight-year-old autistic and mentally 
retarded man, as defined by Article 17A.  LegalHealth recently 
represented John’s father and sister in an Article 17A proceeding.  As 
required by the statute, both John’s primary care physician and a 
licensed psychologist provided affidavits on the standard court-
                                                                                                                 
 69. Id. 
 70. N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 81.10 (McKinney 2016). 
 71. Id. § 81.09(a). 
 72. Id. § 81.09(c)(5). 
 73. Id. § 81.09(c). 
2016] PETITIONING FOR PROTECTION 887 
mandated forms.74  At the request of the court, a comprehensive 
psycho-social evaluation was completed and submitted to the court by 
Young Adult Institute, Inc. (YAI), a network of agencies offering 
people with intellectual and developmental disabilities a wide range 
of services.75 
John’s physician and the psychologist both checked the boxes, 
stating the he is mentally retarded and developmentally disabled.  
YAI described John as an ambulatory, non-verbal male, who 
appeared well groomed and seasonally dressed.  The psychologist 
wrote that he was cooperative during the interview and kept eye 
contact, though he was unable to respond to any questions posed to 
him.  Though he is now non-verbal, the evaluation detailed that John 
had been able to say a few words in his youth and had attended public 
school where he was enrolled in special education classes through 
graduation.  They concluded that John’s receptive and expressive 
abilities are poor and that he requires a large amount of assistance 
with his activities of daily living, such as brushing his teeth, bathing, 
dressing, and undressing.  The New York State Office of Children and 
Family Services performed the required background check on both 
John’s father and sister.76  John and his family appeared at a hearing 
in Surrogate’s Court.  John’s father and sister were appointed his 
guardian and standby guardian respectively. Our office closed the file 
and wished John and his family luck. 
Six months later, John’s father and sister returned to our office, 
alarmed over a notice that John’s homecare services were being 
terminated.  We agreed to investigate their case for possible 
representation.  As part of our investigation, we requested John’s file 
from the homecare agency.  The file contained numerous allegations 
of verbal abuse and maltreatment committed by the father and sister 
against many of John’s home attendants.  Even more disturbing was 
an allegation of physical abuse directed at John.  We also learned that 
this was not the first time the family had to dispute loss of homecare 
services due to similar allegations. 
John’s Article 17A guardianship proceeding went very smoothly 
and was very routine.  All requirements built into the statute, as well 
                                                                                                                 
 74. See N.Y. SURR. CT. PROC. ACT LAW § 1752 (McKinney 2016). 
 75. See YAI, www.yai.org [https://perma.cc/3TJM-GP7R]. 
 76. See N.Y. SURR. CT. PROC. ACT § 1706(2) (McKinney 2016) (requiring the 
Department of Social Services to do a background check), § 1761 (stating that all 
provisions for proceedings for an “infant,” as set forth in Article 17 of the SCPA, 
shall apply in proceedings for a “mentally retarded” or “developmentally disabled” 
person pursuant to Article 17A). 
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as the extra protections mandated by the court, were satisfied.  Yet, 
there was nothing in this process that tipped off either LegalHealth or 
the court that the appointment of John’s father and sister as guardians 
may not have been in John’s best interest.  Due process requires the 
appointment of an attorney or GAL in every guardianship 
proceeding.  At a minimum, there should be a provision to ensure 
that the only evidence before the court is not submitted by an 
interested party with motivation to lie, obscure, or omit crucial 
information.  Were this an Article 81 proceeding, or were Article 17A 
to provide for it, a conscientious court evaluator would have ideally 
spoken to John’s home attendants and requested a copy of his file.  A 
GAL or attorney for John would also have been expected to collect 
such information and assist John to articulate any preferences or 
concerns that he may have had. 
Although John had a guardianship hearing, this is not required in 
Article 17A proceedings.77  In contrast to Article 17A, a hearing must 
always be held in Article 81 proceedings.78  With few exceptions, the 
presence of the AIP in Article 81 proceedings is required at the 
hearing “so as to permit the court to obtain its own impression of the 
person’s capacity.”79 
As attorneys for the petitioners, LegalHealth also faced an ethical 
dilemma upon learning of the alleged abuse of John post-
appointment.  Rule 1.6 of the New York State Rules of Professional 
Conduct states, in relevant part, that “(b) a lawyer may reveal or use 
confidential information to the extent that the lawyer reasonably 
believes necessary: (1) to prevent reasonably certain death or 
substantial bodily harm.”80  While we learned of various accusations 
of verbal hostility aimed at home health aides and one incident of 
alleged physical abuse of the ward, our clients insisted they were 
complete fabrications.  We did not have any actual knowledge of 
abuse taking place.  The alleged abuse listed in a complaint was, 
specifically, a slap across John’s face when he refused to take his 
medications.  Based upon the accusations, which we learned of 
second-hand in a homecare agency file, we had no reasonable basis 
                                                                                                                 
 77. Id. § 1754(1) (“[T]he court may in its discretion dispense with a hearing for 
the appointment of a guardian and may in its discretion appoint a guardian ad litem, 
or the mental hygiene legal service . . . to recommend whether the appointment of a 
guardian . . . is in the best interest of the . . . disabled person.”). 
 78. N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 81.11 (McKinney 2016). 
 79. Id. § 81.11(c). 
 80. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 1200.0 (2016) (citing Rule 1.6). 
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upon which to conclude the ward was subject to a threat of 
reasonably certain death or substantial bodily harm. 
As horrific as slapping a person with intellectual disabilities is, 
upending a guardianship based on second-hand accusations is a 
drastic move without further evidence.  Moreover, it is not permitted 
by Rule 1.6(b).  Rule 1.6 strictly prohibits the revelation of a client’s 
confidential information.81  “The confidentiality duty applies not only 
to matters communicated in confidence by the client, which are 
protected by the attorney-client privilege, but also to all information 
gained during and relating to the representation, whatever its 
source.”82  Revealing confidential information is permitted, though 
not required, under Section (b).  Without more concrete evidence of 
abuse—and more precisely, a reasonably certain likelihood of future 
substantial bodily harm—rising to the level defined by Rule 1.6, we 
were not permitted, in this instance, to reveal the information. 
We also made the very difficult decision not to represent John, via 
his guardians, in the homecare case.  While we feel this was the 
appropriate decision in this case, it is important to clarify that the 
standard used when deciding to represent any person on a totally new 
matter is different than the standard used when deciding whether to 
report an existing client’s alleged misconduct to authorities.  Taking 
on a new case for an individual is, of course, never an obligation; and, 
due to a general lack of resources in civil legal aid organizations, 
representation has to be prioritized out of necessity.  Considering 
these different standards, we deemed it inappropriate to represent the 
guardians in the home care matter and inappropriate to report the 
guardians to the court. 
This dilemma is a perfect, yet unfortunate, illustration of the 
position in which lawyers can be put when navigating the lack of 
protections available in Article 17A.  It is very possible that the 
allegations against our clients were untrue and the statute worked as 
intended.  It is equally possible that due to the lack of procedural 
protections, an abusive guardian slipped through the cracks.  At this 
point, the only party involved in John’s guardianship proceeding, with 
knowledge of the allegations, is ethically prohibited from revealing 
the information.  Under Article 17A, it has become apparent that to 
avoid situations like John’s, lawyers must either refuse to represent 
                                                                                                                 
 81. See id. (citing Rule 1.6). 
 82. Id. (citing Rule 1.6, Comment [3]). 
890 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XLIII 
clients in Article 17A proceedings or take extraordinary 
precautions.83 
C. Article 17A Endangers Persons with Intellectual Disabilities by 
Providing No Post-Appointment Protections 
If not avoided in the first instance, John’s situation could have 
potentially been corrected if Article 17A contained appropriate post-
appointment procedural protections.  After a guardian is appointed 
for an adult with intellectual disabilities in Article 17A proceedings, 
the court issues guardianship papers and has no further contact with 
either the ward or the guardian.  We attribute this to the same 
diagnosis-driven approach that results in the severe lack of pre-
appointment protections.  The attitude of the legislature that enacted 
Article 17A seemed to be that mental retardation is permanent and 
hopeless, so any further monitoring by the court would be useless.84  
Even if this were correct, there is no rational basis to believe that a 
guardian, once appointed, will fulfill her duties competently and with 
good faith for the rest of time.  Such lack of oversight is misguided. 
In contrast, Article 81 offers post-appointment protections in two 
important ways.  First, Article 81 seeks to ensure that all 
incapacitated people are appointed a guardian who is sufficiently 
capable.  Pursuant to Section 81.39, upon appointment, all guardians 
are required to complete a court-approved training course that covers 
the legal responsibilities of the guardian, the rights of the 
incapacitated person, the benefits and resources available to 
incapacitated persons, and provides instructions on how to complete 
the initial and annual reports.85 
Second, Article 81 provides for continuous oversight by the court 
by requiring the guardian to file an initial report within ninety days of 
appointment, and an annual report for every year of service.86  The 
initial report requires the guardian to provide an inventory of the 
property and financial resources of the incapacitated person, as well 
as the guardian’s plan for management of such resources.87  To the 
                                                                                                                 
 83. See discussion infra Part IV.B. 
 84. The legislative history states that the purpose of Article 17A was to provide 
parents a lifetime guardianship because “the present law does not take into account 
the unique status of a retardate in that the fact and degree of retardations and the 
need for guidance and assistance are determinable from a very early age and remain 
so for life.” Bailly & Nick-Torok, supra note 9, at 819 (quoting 1969 N.Y. LEGIS. ANN. 
25, 325). 
 85. N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 81.39 (McKinney 2016). 
 86. Id. § 81.30. 
 87. Id. 
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extent the guardian has been granted powers over the person, the 
initial report must include a summary of all visits the guardian has 
paid to the incapacitated person, steps taken to provide for the 
person’s personal needs, and a plan to provide for the future needs of 
the incapacitated person, including medical care, social services, and 
public benefits.88  The guardian must file the initial report with the 
court and mail copies to the court evaluator, counsel for the 
incapacitated person, and the incapacitated person herself.89 
The guardian’s annual report must include current contact 
information for both the guardian and incapacitated person, an 
account of how the guardian has managed the incapacitated person’s 
property, and a statement regarding any change to the person’s 
physical or mental condition over the past year.90  The guardian is 
required to have the incapacitated person’s functional abilities and 
limitations evaluated by an appropriate medical professional within 
three months prior to the filing of the annual report and the medical 
professional’s written evaluation is a required component of the 
annual report.  A list of all medical treatment provided to the 
incapacitated person must be included, as well as a plan for any 
medical treatment needed in the upcoming year.91  The guardian’s 
annual report even requires information concerning the social 
condition of the incapacitated person, such as social services used and 
a description of the person’s social skills and social needs.92 
The protections provided by Article 81 are not failsafe.  
Undoubtedly, some incapacitated persons fall through the cracks and 
have abusive or neglectful guardians.  However, the existence of these 
protections alone elevates Article 81 far above Article 17A.  In fact, 
at least one New York court has applied the Mathews v. Eldridge 
three-prong due process test93 to determine that, as currently written, 
Article 17A is unconstitutional due to the lack of post-appointment 
periodic reporting and review for guardians of the person.94  And, 
similar to our discussion above in Part II.A, another New York court 
found Article 17A unconstitutional due to its unduly restrictive, 
plenary nature.95  We discuss both of these cases in the next section. 
                                                                                                                 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. § 81.31. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
 93. 424 U.S. 319 (1976). 
 94. In re Mark C.H., 28 Misc. 3d 765, 776–87 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 2010). 
 95. See In re Dameris L., 38 Misc. 3d 570 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 2012). 
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D. Recent Court Attempts to Salvage Article 17A 
Many have argued that Article 17A is unconstitutional—under 
both the New York State and the federal constitutions—based on the 
lack of procedural protections afforded to individuals with intellectual 
disabilities discussed in Parts II.A-C.  In response, some New York 
courts have read additional procedural protections into the statute.  
Some recent decisions, two of which are discussed below, are 
illustrative of the constitutional concerns and how the courts have 
endeavored to salvage Article 17A by reading in due process 
protections not specifically required by the statute. 
1. In re Mark C.H. and Annual Reporting Requirements After 
Appointment of a Guardian 
In 2010, the New York Surrogate’s Court decided In re Mark C.H. 
and found that, in order to comply with constitutionally protected due 
process requirements, annual reporting must be read into Article 
17A.96 
Mark was an adopted child diagnosed with autism at age seven.97  
He was institutionalized following the death of his adoptive mother 
from cancer.98  At age fourteen, he entered a residential center for 
people with autism.99  Mark’s adoptive mother left behind a sizeable 
estate.100  After her death, an Article 17A proceeding was initiated by 
a co-trustee of a three million dollar trust to which Mark was the 
beneficiary.101 
The health care providers at Mark’s autism facility described him 
“as suffering from ‘profound’ mental retardation and autism.”102  
According to the physician, Mark is “‘nonverbal, has poor social 
skills,’ ‘engages in numerous repetitive and self-stimulating behavior’ 
and ‘exhibits aggressive behavior when placed in unfamiliar 
settings . . . includ[ing] spitting, throwing objects, and hitting his own 
head.’”103  Based on the latter, the professionals recommended that 
Mark’s appearance at the Article 17A hearing be dispensed with.104 
                                                                                                                 
 96. See Mark C.H., 28 Misc. 3d 786–787. 
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The court appointed a Mental Hygiene Legal Services attorney to 
represent Mark.105  The co-trustee petitioner had never visited Mark 
prior to the initiation of the guardianship proceedings and never 
contacted authorities at the autism center.106  Moreover, the three 
million dollars in the trust had not been spent on Mark at the time of 
the hearing.107  Additionally, a GAL was appointed, and the 
petitioner was ordered to meet with Mark for the first time.108 
Using funds from the trust, the trustees acquired a certified care 
manager to assess Mark.109  Despite his diagnosis of profound mental 
retardation and autism, the care manager observed Mark in “a 
classroom setting, noting that ‘though he is non-verbal, he appeared 
to respond appropriately to questions asked by classroom staff, using 
picture symbols and non-verbal gestures to communicate with 
others.’”110  The certified care manager was told by personnel at the 
autism center where Mark resided that Mark “‘enjoys swinging and 
climbing outdoors’ but, unfortunately, ‘there is no playground in the 
vicinity of his residence.’”111 
Mark received ongoing care management, access to more 
appropriate medications, and graduated from his educational 
program.112  At the time of the proceedings, he was enrolled in 
vocational training and seeking community placement.113  The court 
found that “[a]lthough his basic needs were met, he lacked the 
resources to reach his best potential and to thrive.”114  The court 
further observed that “[t]he facts in this case dramatically 
demonstrate why a statute that gives a guardian control over the life 
of a person with mental retardation and/or developmental disabilities 
must include provision for periodic court review.”115 
The court used the three-pronged test found in Mathews v. 
Eldridge116 to answer the question, “What process is due?”117  The 
                                                                                                                 
 105. Id. at 767 n.3. 
 106. Id. at 767. 
 107. Id. 
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 109. Id. at 768. 
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 112. Id. at 769. 
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 114. Id. 
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 116. 424 U.S. 319 (1976) (addressing the Due Process Clause of the Fifth 
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first prong asks what private interest will be affected by the action.118  
The second prong evaluates “the risk of an erroneous deprivation of 
such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if 
any of additional or substitute procedural safeguards.”119  The third 
prong instructs the court to weigh the “[g]overnment’s interest, 
including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative 
burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement 
would entail.”120 
The court easily answered the first prong, noting that “imposition 
of virtually complete power over the ward clearly and dramatically 
infringes on a ward’s liberty interests.”121  As to the second prong, the 
court concluded that “without periodic reporting and review, [Article 
17A] could leave functioning, capacitated adults with guardians 
whose powers constitute a ‘massive curtailment of liberty.’”122  The 
court iterated that “[w]ith a periodic reporting and review 
requirement . . . the court can ascertain whether the deprivation of 
liberty resulting from guardianship is still justified by the ward’s 
disabilities, or whether she has progressed to a level where she can 
live and function on her own.”123  Additionally, and similar to the 
LegalHealth example involving John and his family,124 the court 
noted: 
Much more likely, but equally serious, is the possibility that a 
guardian is no longer acting in the ward’s best interests.  The 
guardian may have removed the ward from a program providing 
habilitation services for her own convenience but to the ward’s 
detriment.  She may fail to attend to the ward’s physical health 
needs.  She may have confined the ward to a single room, without 
outside stimulation, for years, causing the ward to “lose” the skills 
and capacities she learned while still in the educational system.  She 
may fail to provide for the ward properly because she lacks 
                                                                                                                 
(addressing how analysis of an individual’s procedural due process rights under New 
York State statute falls under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment). 
 117. Mark C.H., 28 Misc. 3d at 776. But see In re Chaim A.K., 26 Misc. 3d 837 
(N.Y. Sur. Ct. 2009) (refusing to read in additional protections and denying the 
Article 17A petition without prejudice to commencing an Article 81 guardianship 
proceeding). 
 118. Mark C.H., 28 Misc. 3d at 776. 
 119. Id. (quoting Mathews). 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. at 778 (internal citations omitted). 
 123. Id. at 777–78. 
 124. See discussion supra Part II.B. 
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knowledge of how to do so, often because of language limitations, or 
she may herself have become disabled, or partially disabled.125 
In its discussion of the third prong, the court noted that the policy 
of New York State is “the promotion and attainment of 
independence, inclusion, individuality and productivity for persons 
with mental retardation and developmental disabilities.”126  The court 
explained that the government’s interest was “nothing less than 
ensuring that when, in the exercise of its parens patriae power, it 
places almost total control over a person with disabilities in the hands 
of another, that person is, at the very least, no worse off than she 
would have been had no guardianship been imposed.”127  After its 
evaluation of the three-pronged Mathews test, the court held: 
[I]t is clear that a court granting guardianship of the mentally 
retarded and developmentally disabled must require periodic 
reporting and review—or “monitoring”—by 17–A guardians of the 
person, even as it does, by statute, of 17–A guardians of the 
property.  This monitoring requirement is inherent not only in the 
Fourteenth Amendment guarantee of due process of law, but also 
under the international human rights norms contained in the 
[Convention and Optional Protocol on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities] and the [International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights].128 
2. In re Dameris L. and the Least Restrictive Alternative to 
Achieve the State’s Goal 
Guardianship should be a last resort.  Before subjecting someone 
to such a “[d]raconian loss of liberty,”129 as an Article 17A 
guardianship, it must be determined that there is not a less restrictive 
alternative available.  In In re Dameris L., the court found that 
Article 17A would violate the due process guarantees of both the 
U.S. Constitution and New York State Constitution unless it was 
“read to include the requirement that guardianship is the least 
restrictive alternative to achieve the state’s goal of protecting a 
person with intellectual disabilities from harm connected to those 
disabilities.”130  In Dameris L., a mother petitioned for guardianship 
over her twenty-nine-year-old daughter, Dameris, who was found to 
                                                                                                                 
 125. Mark C.H., 28 Misc. 3d at 778. 
 126. Id. at 780. 
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have “mild to moderate mental retardation, and to be ‘functioning at 
the mental age of a seven year old.’”131  She reportedly had “poor 
receptive and expressive skills—[and, while] ambulatory and able to 
care for most of her grooming needs, she [was] highly dependent for 
all other needs, including medical and financial matters.”132  
Moreover, she was “sporadically[] attending a day adult habilitation 
program . . . where she was learning, and supervised in, cleaning tasks, 
particularly cleaning bathrooms.”133 
Dameris was also married.134  When Dameris was pregnant, her 
mother petitioned for a guardianship under Article 17A.135  At the 
hearing, Dameris’ husband appeared, initiating a “struggle over 
control of Dameris.”136  The court concluded that “Dameris, very 
visibly pregnant, showed flat affect, spoke haltingly and in a limited 
way, and, on all of the evidence adduced at the hearing, appeared 
incapable of caring for herself and her soon to be born baby.”137 
Nobody in Dameris’ family spoke English.138  They were also all 
people with disabilities, receiving Supplemental Security Income 
(SSI) and other public benefits.139  The court appointed a GAL to 
assist Dameris.140  The primary issue at the hearing was over 
responsibility for Dameris and her baby after she gave birth.141  The 
court found an attorney to assist as a pro bono mediator in the 
proceedings, which helped Dameris’ mother and husband agree on an 
arrangement in which they were appointed co-guardians.142 
Dameris and her husband then had a subsidy cut off resulting in 
the loss of their housing.143  At the time, Dameris’ mother was out of 
the country and her husband petitioned to revoke Dameris’ mother’s 
co-guardianship.144  The court temporarily relieved Dameris’ mother 
as guardian until her return to New York.145  At the hearings after the 
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mother’s return, Dameris appeared more confident and dealt 
appropriately with her children.146  She had become friendly with her 
neighbors who were assisting her.147  The couple now presented more 
as partners as opposed to guardian and ward.148  As a result, the court 
terminated the Article 17A guardianship.149 
Due to Dameris’ mother moving out of state and consenting to 
terminate the guardianship, the court lost jurisdiction over Dameris 
and the guardianship ended.150  The court explained, however, that: 
[E]ven if this were not the case, I would find that guardianship is no 
longer warranted because there is now a system of supported 
decision making in place that constitutes a less restrictive alternate 
to the Draconian loss of liberty entailed by a plenary 17-A 
guardianship.  This use of supported decision making, rather than a 
guardian’s substituted decision making, is also consistent with 
international human rights, most particularly article 12 of the United 
Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities.151 
The Court ultimately held that: 
In order to withstand constitutional challenge, including, 
particularly, challenge under our own State Constitution’s 
due process guarantees, SCPA article 17-A must be read to include 
the requirement that guardianship is the least restrictive alternative 
to achieve the State’s goal of protecting a person with intellectual 
disabilities from harm connected to those disabilities.  Further, the 
court must consider the availability of “other resources,” like those 
in Mental Hygiene Law § 81.03 (e), including a support network of 
family, friends and professionals before the drastic judicial 
intervention of guardianship can be imposed.152 
Due to its diagnosis-driven approach, Article 17A fails at every stage 
of the guardianship process to protect people with intellectual 
disabilities from a total loss of liberty and to allow them an 
opportunity to reach their full potential.  Unfortunately, Article 17A 
was not enacted with these purposes in mind.  As we discuss below, 
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Article 17A also fails to live up to the purposes for which it was 
enacted. 
III.  ARTICLE 17A DOES NOT LIVE UP TO ITS ORIGINAL PURPOSE 
OF ELIMINATING THE COSTS AND COMPLICATIONS INVOLVED IN 
GUARDIANSHIP PROCEEDINGS AND IS NOT, IN PRACTICE, LESS 
ONEROUS THAN ARTICLE 81 GUARDIANSHIPS 
At the time it was adopted, Article 17A was intended to be a less 
onerous process for parents of “retardates” than the costly and 
complex procedures of the committee and conservatorship laws in 
existence at the time.153  Thus, Article 17A is an abbreviated 
proceeding in Surrogate’s Court that uses standardized forms to 
prove incompetence and, pursuant to the statute, does not even 
require a hearing.154  Citing the expense and complexity of Article 81, 
some practitioners still argue that Article 17A is a valuable planning 
document for parents to maintain continuous care for their children 
with intellectual disabilities, and to hand pick a successor for when 
they are no longer able to care for their children themselves.155 
Article 17A, however, sacrifices procedural protections and the 
due process rights of adults with intellectual disabilities in the name of 
simplicity and convenience for their caretakers.  In our experience, 
the supposed simplicity and convenience of Article 17A is grossly 
exaggerated.  Without representation, even the abbreviated 
proceeding contemplated by Article 17A is too complicated and 
unattainable for many of our clients. 
Although Article 17A is thought to be easier for pro se petitioners 
because the petition and supporting documents are all available as 
court provided standardized forms, the forms are still too complicated 
for most of our clients to complete independently.  One form requires 
the proposed guardian to provide her address history, as well as the 
                                                                                                                 
 153. Bailly & Nick-Torok, supra note 9, at 818 n.3 (“A statutory provision which 
will provide for lifetime guardianship of a retarded individual to eliminate the cost 
and complications caused by a separate proceeding in a separate court at age 21, 
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the fact and degree of retardation and the need for guidance and assistance are 
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 154. N.Y. SURR. CT. PROC. ACT LAW § 1754 (McKinney 2016) (“The court may in 
its discretion dispense with a hearing for the appointment of a guardian.”). 
 155. Radigan & Hillman, supra note 7. 
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address history for any person eighteen-years-old or older who lives 
with her, for the past twenty-eight years.156  This form is not 
formatted intuitively and does not provide clear directions on which 
addresses to include.  It sometimes requires several submissions and 
rejections before the form is deemed sufficient and accepted by the 
clerk for filing.  For example, our office has been advised by the 
Surrogate’s Court clerk to “guess” when our clients cannot remember 
the street number or dates that they lived at a certain address. 
In our experience, at least in New York City where we practice, the 
courts are aware that the statutory requirements of Article 17A do 
not adequately protect the interests of the person for whom 
guardianship is sought.  In response, the courts have bolstered the 
filing requirements beyond what is required by statute.  For example, 
in addition to two physicians’ affidavits, the courts usually require a 
comprehensive psychosocial evaluation or psychological report.  This 
is usually an eight to ten page evaluation describing the ward’s living 
situation, biographical history, and functional level in greater detail 
than the physicians’ affidavits.  The courts also do not schedule a case 
for hearing if the physicians’ affidavits were completed more than one 
year prior to the next available hearing date.  Instead, the courts 
require that the petitioner complete the affidavits again. 
The statutory focus on the diagnosis of wards produces other 
practical hurdles for our clients as well.  The physicians’ affidavits are 
often a burden for our clients to complete.  The primary care 
physician affidavit is usually not difficult to obtain.  But many of our 
clients do not have a regularly treating psychiatrist, neurologist, or 
someone else qualified to complete the second affidavit.  In those 
instances, they need a referral to a specialist for the sole purpose of 
completing the second affidavit. 
Many physicians also refuse to complete the affidavit on the (valid) 
basis that they have only met with the ward once and lack sufficient 
evidence to render an opinion on the ward’s competency.  If the 
physician completes the form, he or she may do a cursory job that the 
court may later reject for not containing sufficient detail.  As a result, 
our clients pay for an additional appointment with a specialist for no 
real benefit. 
We refer many of our clients whose loved one with intellectual 
disabilities does not have a regularly treating physician to non-profit 
                                                                                                                 
 156. See N.Y. STATE OFFICE OF CHILDREN & FAMILY SERVS., REQUEST FOR 
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organizations, such as YAI157 or AHRC.158  These non-profit 
organizations are able to complete the physicians’ affidavits as well as 
provide comprehensive psychosocial evaluations.159  However, the 
waiting list for an appointment may be six months or more.  Often, by 
the time the second affidavit is complete, the first one is more than a 
year old and must be redone. 
Another hurdle for many of our clients involves giving proper 
notice to all interested parties.  If living, the statute requires that both 
parents and all adult siblings—and anyone else that may have had a 
close relationship with the ward—be served with Notice of Petition.160  
Many of our clients are single parents.  Often, our clients’ partners 
abandoned them when their children were young.  As a result, our 
clients have had little, if any, contact with their partners for several 
years. 
Finding a missing parent on whom to serve the Notice of Petition, 
not to mention finding all of the missing parent’s children with other 
people (i.e., half-siblings of the ward) is a daunting and overwhelming 
task to most of our clients.  Although the statute does not require it, 
the courts prefer a Waiver of Process Renunciation and Consent to 
Appointment of Guardian (“Waiver and Consent”) from parents,161 a 
form in which the parent not seeking guardianship may consent to the 
appointment of a guardian for the ward and waive all future 
service.162  If the parent’s whereabouts are known, the court has 
insisted upon the Waiver and Consent and rejected proof of service of 
the Notice of Petition. 
In our experience, petitioners are generally loving people with 
limited means and education doing their best to support and care for 
their loved ones with sometimes severe disabilities.  When faced with 
gathering all of the information required for a guardianship 
proceeding, scheduling multiple medical appointments, and 
navigating the filing and service requirements, parents often become 
overwhelmed and give up.  Despite our best efforts to assist clients 
with this process, a significant proportion of parents do not follow 
                                                                                                                 
 157. See YAI, supra note 75. 
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through, lose touch with us, and never complete the guardianship 
process. 
Our point is not that notice should not be required for extended 
family members, nor that outdated medical reports should be 
sufficient for determining that a person is incapacitated.  Rather, 
Article 17A is not the streamlined, pro se-friendly proceeding for the 
parents of adults with intellectual disabilities it was intended to be.  
The burdens and difficulties of completing an Article 17A proceeding 
are not significantly less than the requirements for an Article 81 
proceeding.  Thus, many of the protections and due process rights of 
the ward are sacrificed for no real gain in convenience or simplicity. 
IV.  RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. Article 17A Should Be Repealed 
The unconstitutional lack of due process protections and the 
diagnosis-driven approach of Article 17A are indefensible.  For these 
reasons, Article 17A ought to be repealed and all guardianship 
proceedings in New York should be brought pursuant to Article 81.  
Article 81 solves many of the due process concerns that Article 17A 
presents by requiring narrowly crafted guardianships.  Article 81 only 
grants a guardian those powers necessary to provide for the AIP 
demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence of incapacity.163  
Article 81’s standard focuses on the functional level of the AIP, 
requiring the appointment of a court evaluator,164 the filing of annual 
reports by the guardian,165 and guardianship training.166 
The underlying cause of mental disability (i.e., the diagnosis) 
should not be the focus of a guardianship proceeding, nor should it 
determine what procedural protections a person is afforded.  Given 
that Article 81 is a far superior piece of legislation, and more in line 
with contemporary standards of treatment of people with intellectual 
disabilities, Article 81 should be used for all guardianships in New 
York. 
If repeal of Article 17A, however, is politically infeasible, the only 
other acceptable policy reform would be to complete the review of 
the statute mandated twenty-five years ago.  Under such a review, the 
legislature would undertake a complete overhaul of Article 17A in 
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order to bring it line with the more evolved “care, treatment and 
understanding of [mentally retarded and/or developmentally 
disabled] individuals” of today.167 
On the other hand, it is difficult to see what the value of these 
reforms would be, as opposed to repeal.  The major argument for 
keeping Article 17A—which we have already shown is highly 
suspect168—is the ease, convenience, and affordability it may provide 
pro se parents or guardians.  Even so, it is difficult to see how these 
supposed benefits could carry over to an Article 17A proceeding with 
the appropriate safeguards and procedural protections in place.  It 
makes more sense to repeal Article 17A and enact the reforms 
necessary to make Article 81 more accessible and more affordable for 
guardians.169 
Of course, the repeal of Article 17A would necessitate some 
changes to Article 81.  Article 81 should be more accessible to people 
of lesser means.  That would mean lower fees, a reduction in 
paperwork, and greater access to counsel—which of course would 
require increased funding to legal services organizations and a push 
for more pro bono assistance from the legal community at large. 
Still, it would be remiss of us not to mention at least some of the 
negative aspects of Article 81 guardianships as well as the direction in 
which a large portion of the international community and many 
leading advocates in the United States are headed in terms of 
protecting and nurturing the autonomy of individuals with intellectual 
disabilities.170  These advocates argue for a move away from a 
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 170. See generally THE GUARDIANSHIP CLINIC, supra note 26; Glen, supra note 16; 
Salzman, supra note 35. 
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guardianship system to a system that would promote “supported 
decision-making.”171  In doing so, they look to international law and 
experience to make their case.172  The United Nations Convention on 
the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD), specifically Article 
12, guarantees full legal capacity as a fundamental human right.173  
Judge Kristin Booth Glen describes Article 12 as containing three 
“paradigm-shifting assertions”: 
(1) [P]ersons with disabilities have the right to recognition 
everywhere as persons before the law [and] 
(2) States Parties shall recognize that persons with disabilities enjoy 
legal capacity on an equal basis with others in all aspects of life [and 
that] 
(3) States Parties shall take appropriate measures to provide access 
by persons with disabilities to the support they may require in 
exercising their legal capacity.174 
More concisely, Article 12 redefines “persons with intellectual 
disabilities not merely as legal subjects with certain defined rights, but 
as legal actors with full capacity, equal to that of all other, non-
disabled persons.”175  Additionally, the responsibility for facilitating 
and supporting persons with intellectual disabilities in exercising their 
legal capacity is placed directly on the state.176  This treaty has been 
signed by President Obama and, though not yet ratified by the 
Senate, was passed by the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on 
July 26, 2012.177  If ratified, the treaty would be binding, and the U.S. 
might have no choice but to change the law of guardianships to one of 
supported decision-making.178 
Moreover, some advocates, in particular Leslie Salzman,179 have 
argued that Article 81 potentially violates the “integration mandate” 
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of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).180  The ADA 
“explicitly recogniz[es] that socially-created conditions and barriers, 
rather than disabled peoples’ individual ‘defects,’ are the cause of 
exclusion and nonparticipation.”181  Title II of the ADA provides that 
“no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such 
disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits 
of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be 
subjected to discrimination by any such entity.”182  Pursuant to Title 
II, the Attorney General issued the “‘integration mandate,’ which 
requires that public entities ‘administer services, programs, and 
activities in the most integrated setting appropriate to the needs of 
qualified individuals with disabilities.’”183  “Most integrated setting” is 
defined as “a setting that enables individuals with disabilities to 
interact with non-disabled persons to the fullest extent possible.”184  
The important tie-in here is Leslie Salzman’s argument: supported 
decision-making is a less restrictive, more integrated alternative to 
guardianship.185  The failure to provide the least restrictive alternative 
“presumptively violates the integration mandate.”186 
While it may be optimal to repeal both Article 17A and Article 81 
by adopting instead a supported-decision making model, this Essay 
was not written to advocate for the repeal of Article 81.  Without a 
drastic increase in resources to AIPs, supported decision-making is 
not realistic at this time.  Until additional resources are made 
available, Article 81 remains a “model” guardianship statute in many 
ways.  Article 81’s due process protections are not insignificant.  The 
statute guarantees a hearing to avoid the deprivation of the AIP’s 
decision-making rights,187 the appointment of a court evaluator,188 
and counsel, if requested.189  “The statute mandates a least restrictive 
alternative approach so that persons under guardianship are deprived 
of no more of their decision-making rights than are necessary to 
                                                                                                                 
matters relating to public and private disability and health-related benefits and 
insurance, housing, and consumer transactions. Id.  She is an expert in Elder law, 
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 180. See Salzman, supra note 35, at 160. 
 181. Glen, supra note 16, at 126. 
 182. 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (2014). 
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 184. Id. at 186–87. 
 185. Id. at 217. 
 186. Id. at 219. 
 187. N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 81.11 (McKinney 2016). 
 188. Id. § 81.09. 
 189. Id. § 81.10. 
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protect them from harm.”190  Additionally, “[d]etailed reporting 
requirements aim to ensure that guardians remain accountable to 
those under guardianship and to the courts.”191 
It is of significant importance that the same arguments made 
against Article 81192 can also be made against Article 17A.  There is 
arguably even a stronger case to be made that Article 17A violates 
both the CRPD and the integration mandate of the ADA.  In the case 
of Article 17A, of course, there is a clearly less restrictive alternative 
already in place: Article 81. 
The fact, however, that there is no realistic alternative to Article 81 
guardianship at this point should not serve as an occasion for 
celebration.  Rather, it should focus our attention on the potential 
loss of autonomy for these individuals and a call for more resources—
so supported decision-making may one day be possible.  As Judge 
Glen reminds us, “regardless of the procedural protection she is 
afforded, the respect given her past views, and the commitment to 
enhancing or reestablishing capacity, as to her incapacity, the person 
under guardianship is not, or is no longer, a legal actor.”193 
Another problem with Article 81 guardianships is the routine 
violation of the AIP’s medical privacy.194  As discussed above, the 
enactment of Article 81 was meant to be a move away from the 
medical model of guardianship (as exemplified by Article 17A) and 
toward a more functional capacity framework and less restrictive 
alternative approach to guardianship.195  In practice, some criticize 
Article 81 proceedings because “health care facilities that initiate 
guardianship proceedings routinely disclose medical information 
without the consent of the patient” or a court order.196  In addition to 
running counter to the heart of Article 81 itself, these disclosures, it is 
argued, violate HIPAA and physician-patient privilege.197 
Nevertheless, Article 81 remains a less restrictive alternative to 
Article 17A guardianships and provides much greater procedural 
protections for AIPs both pre- and post-appointment.  It is difficult to 
justify the continued existence of Article 17A.  It is also notable that 
                                                                                                                 
 190. THE GUARDIANSHIP CLINIC, supra note 26, at 2; see also N.Y. MENTAL HYG. 
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“New York is one of only six states that have separate statutes for 
persons with intellectual disabilities and adults who have lost 
capacity.”198  New York is already well behind the curve on this 
issue—about twenty-five years to be exact. 
B. While We Wait for Repeal or Reform: Ethical and Practical 
Considerations 
The seriousness and the urgency of our concerns with Article 17A 
require us, as legal service providers, to take immediate action while 
we wait for policy change.  The following are a series of best practices 
that we recommend practitioners consider prior to agreeing to 
representation of a petitioner, during representation, and even after 
guardianship has been granted. 
1. Considerations Prior to Representation 
First, we believe that legal service providers have the right and 
duty to conduct their own independent investigation concerning the 
ward and the proposed guardians before agreeing to serve as counsel.  
This is especially important given that the only evidence before the 
court in an Article 17A proceeding are two forms completed by the 
ward’s treating physicians plus the word of the petitioner.  Our 
experience with John taught us that this is not sufficient.199  At 
minimum, the attorneys should meet with the ward to get a sense of 
her limitations first-hand and to inquire about the ward’s preference 
for guardianship.  Although meeting the ward may seem like an 
obvious first step, many families of loved ones with disabilities do not 
bring them to appointments unless specifically asked.  Many families 
may believe that the ward’s presence would be disruptive, or it may 
be particularly difficult for a non-ambulatory or bedbound ward to 
travel. 
In addition to meeting the ward, the attorney should inquire about 
any previous investigations or referrals to protective service agencies.  
If possible, the attorney should question close relatives and caretakers 
of the ward and petitioner as part of a pre-retainer investigation.  If 
other family members voice concerns or object to the appointment, 
the attorney must consider whether their claims are credible.  If the 
attorney finds the claims credible and of such a nature that an 
appointment of this particular petitioner would not be in the best 
                                                                                                                 
 198. Glen, supra note 16, at 119 n.125 (“The others are California, Connecticut, 
Idaho, Kentucky, and Michigan.”) (citations omitted). 
 199. See discussion supra Part II.B. 
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interest of the ward, the attorney should refuse further assistance to 
the petitioner.  If at any time the attorney determines that continuing 
with the guardianship would not be in the best interest of the ward, 
the attorney may withdraw from representation. 
Prior to representation in any guardianship proceeding, advocates 
should always consider alternatives to guardianship.  It is important to 
remember that guardianship is a last resort and advocates should 
always seek the least restrictive alternative.  If the advocate 
determines that the ward has the capacity to execute a power of 
attorney or health care proxy, guardianship proceedings would be 
inappropriate.  The advocate should research all available options 
and resources available to help the ward function in society without 
the need for guardianship, such as representative payment, home care 
services, and supportive housing. 
For instance, take Michael’s story.  His parents visited our legal 
clinic with the hope of obtaining a guardianship over their son.  It was 
clear from the beginning that they were loving parents and only 
hoped to do what was best for Michael.  Michael’s doctors were also 
eager to assist his family.  They provided generous medical affidavits 
that probably would have been sufficient to obtain an Article 17A 
guardianship.  During the consultation process, Michael would often 
call our office and leave long rambling messages that the attorney 
could not decipher without the assistance of Michael’s mother to 
translate.  To be clear, Michael speaks English.  After speaking with 
his mother, it became clear that Michael had legitimate concerns 
about the guardianship.  The attorney reached out to Michael’s 
doctor as well who, while obviously trying to preserve guardianship as 
an option for Michael, made it clear that Michael made all of his own 
doctor’s appointments and was always on time. 
At this point, the attorney determined that he must meet Michael 
and investigate alternative solutions.  After meeting Michael in 
person, the attorney had no doubt that Michael understood most of 
what was happening.  Michael also clearly expressed his hope to move 
out of his parent’s home and into supportive housing.  In person, the 
attorney was able to get Michael to slow his speech down, which 
turned out to be the problem in understanding Michael’s voicemails, 
and have a meaningful conversation with him.  Ultimately, 
LegalHealth helped Michael to execute a power of attorney and a 
health care proxy to save his family a lot of time and unnecessary 
effort with the guardianship process.  Most importantly, Michael was 
able to retain his autonomy while allowing his parents to assist him 
with his finances, search for supportive housing, and medical care. 
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2. Considerations During and After Representation 
Once an attorney has decided to represent a petitioner in a 
guardianship proceeding, there are a number of further 
considerations the attorney should take in order to better protect the 
individual with an intellectual disability for whom guardianship is 
sought.  These include either representing the petitioner in an Article 
81 proceeding or representing the petitioner in an Article 17A 
proceeding while asking the court to provide protections to the ward 
beyond those guaranteed in the statute. 
a. Practitioners May Commit to Only Assisting with Article 81 
Guardianships 
We approve of courts’ efforts in Article 17A proceedings to 
ascertain the functional level of the ward in more detail.200  But these 
efforts do not go far enough.  There is still far too much focus on the 
diagnosis of the ward.  The lack of a court evaluator and GAL in 
Article 17A proceedings means that no one is sufficiently 
investigating the ward’s functional capacity, his relationships with his 
family, and his connections to the community.  No third party is 
stepping in to look after the best interests the ward.  Also, in most 
proceedings, the courts do not require post-appointment reports and 
protections for the ward, as would be required under Article 81.201  
Until more pre- and post-appointment protections are required by 
statute, a ward should not have to rely on the luck of drawing a judge 
willing to read protections into the statute.  Even if the ward is so 
lucky, a judge can only go so far before she is effectively rewriting the 
statute. 
If advocates determine that guardianship is the appropriate course, 
and that the proposed petitioner would be the best choice as 
guardian, the best practice solution may be to refuse to do Article 
17A guardianships altogether.  Instead, advocates should insist on 
filing only Article 81 guardianships.  This would take a lot of work 
while we build a practice and familiarize ourselves with Article 81 
proceedings.  But, once we have an Article 81 practice up and 
running, it is difficult to see why this would be any more of a drain on 
our resources than Article 17A proceedings. 
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b. Practitioners May Ask the Court to Read Protections 
Guaranteed under Article 81 Proceedings into Article 17A 
If organizations serving low income clients do not have the 
resources to complete Article 81 guardianships, we believe that many 
of the protections available in Article 81 should be read into Article 
17A—as courts have shown themselves willing to do.202  Furthermore, 
we believe that legal practitioners have the ethical obligation to ask 
the courts to do so. 
As in Mark C.H., practitioners should ask the court to read in 
periodic reporting requirements to review the guardian and ward’s 
status.203  Similarly, as in Dameris L., practitioners should ask the 
court to require that a guardianship under Article 17A be “the least 
restrictive alternative to achieve the state’s goal of protecting a 
person with intellectual disabilities from harm connected to those 
disabilities.”204  Practitioners should also ask the court to look beyond 
the medical certifications and assess the ward’s functional level and 
limitations, as well as her availability of resources.205  This evaluation 
should lead to more limited guardianships, tailored to individual 
wards. 
In re Yvette A. is another example of the ways in which a court can 
read Article 81 protections into Article 17A guardianships.206  In 
Yvette A., however, the court read Article 17A differently.  Unlike 
Mark C.H.,207 the court in Yvette A. did not specifically address the 
constitutionality of Article 17A, but instead found that its power to 
read Article 81 protections into the Article 17A proceedings was 
implicit in the statute itself.208  In Yvette A., a father petitioned to be 
the guardian for his allegedly mentally retarded daughter, Yvette.209  
Yvette was diagnosed as mentally retarded at two-and-a-half years 
old.210  Her mother died when she was nearly three-years-old and her 
father cared for her for a year-and-a-half after the mother’s death.211  
Thereafter, Yvette was placed in a state school and then a social 
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services group home, where she remained at the time of the 
proceedings.212  From 1990 to 2005, Yvette’s father had very little 
contact with her.213 
Yvette was “blind, [had] a history of seizures and anxiety, and 
exhibit[ed] aggressive and self-injurious behavior.”214  Yvette 
required assistance with her daily living activities, including feeding 
and hygiene.215  “While she [could] make simple choices such as 
choosing certain food and drink, she [was] unable to attend to her 
finances, make complex decisions, medical or otherwise, or maintain 
her medical appointments.”216  Yvette required one-on-one attention 
at all times at least in part due to her blindness.217  “Yvette [could] 
communicate by simple sounds such as asking for soda and requesting 
hugs when she meets someone.”218 
Yvette’s father included two certifications from medical doctors in 
his petition.219  Both doctors “concluded that Yvette is severely and 
permanently mentally retarded and that she does not have the 
capacity to make health care decisions.”220  The doctors also 
concluded that “Yvette’s presence at a hearing should be dispensed 
with in view of her inability to understand the proceedings and the 
possibility that her attendance might cause her harm.”221 
In Yvette A., the court reasoned that “[a]lthough, Article 17A does 
not specifically provide for the tailoring of a guardian’s powers or for 
reporting requirements similar to Article 81, the court’s authority to 
impose terms and restrictions that best meet the needs of the ward is 
implicit in the provisions of § 1758 of the SCPA.”222  The court 
further concluded that under Surrogate’s Court Procedure Act 
section 1755, it had the power to modify existing Article 17A orders 
appointing a guardian based on a change in circumstances and that 
the legislative history of Article 17A suggested that the court’s power 
to modify existing orders was indeed broad.223  “By logical extension, 
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a court that has the power to modify a guardianship order once it has 
been issued to meet the needs of the ward surely also has the power 
to tailor the order to meet such needs at the outset.”224 
Based on the medical certifications, the court found that Yvette 
was “mentally retarded” under Article 17A.225  Thus, the court found 
it was in Yvette’s best interests to appoint her father as guardian of 
the person under Article 17A.226  But, due to her father’s absence 
throughout most of Yvette’s life, the court limited the father’s rights 
and responsibilities vis-à-vis his daughter.227 
The court ordered the father to file annual reports that included 
the current addresses for both him and his daughter, reports on 
Yvette’s current medical condition, and any changes in her care.228  
Specifically, he was required to: 
[I]dentify Yvette’s daily activities, including her frequency of 
attendance and participation at the day program, list the 
governmental or other financial benefits that are received by or for 
her, and identify any proposed plan that he has to 
change Yvette’s living arrangements, daily activities or care and the 
reason(s) for such proposed change(s).229 
Finally, he was “also restrained from moving Yvette or changing her 
day program without further order of th[e] Court.”230 
In addition to asking the court to evaluate the totality of the 
circumstances surrounding the ward (including functionality and 
availability of resources), to tailor the guardianship to the specific 
needs of the ward’s circumstances, and to require post-appointment 
annual reporting and review,231 we also recommend that practitioners 
ask for the appointment of a GAL for the ward,232 a court 
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evaluator,233 counsel for ward,234 and insist on a hearing in which the 
ward’s presence is required.235 
3. Ethical Considerations 
There are potentially some ethical concerns raised by asking the 
court to read in additional procedural protections for wards in 
guardianship proceedings.  While our mission is to improve the life of 
patients with intellectual disabilities, our client is the petitioner and 
prospective guardian.  Our client may feel that the additional 
obligations of post-appointment annual reviews, guardianship classes, 
and more in depth investigations performed by a court evaluator are 
adverse to her interests.  We, of course, cannot ask the court to do 
something which our client does not want done.  One way to avoid 
this conflict would be to make the parameters of our representation 
known up front and a condition of acceptance of representation.  In 
this situation, we would engage the prospective client in a discussion 
about due process protections and their necessity.  This would entail 
discussing our requirement that we personally meet with the ward 
him or herself in order to perform a capacity assessment and inquire 
as to the ward’s preference for guardianship.  Only upon a mutual 
understanding and agreement between the attorney and client could 
the representation proceed. 
Even if we chose to only represent clients in Article 81 
proceedings, we would still be obligated to inform our clients of all of 
their options under the law.236  Many might find the prospect of 
guardianship classes and annual reports and reviews as unnecessary 
obstacles and elect to seek new counsel, or proceed pro se.  This is yet 
another reason that Article 17A should be repealed.  No matter how 
noble the efforts of practitioners, the availability of an option that is 
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perceived as easier, cheaper, and involving fewer procedural hurdles 
will, understandably, continue to entice even the most well-
intentioned of prospective guardians. 
CONCLUSION 
Article 17A was passed during a time when society had a limited 
perspective in regard to individuals with intellectual disabilities.  
While legislators were concerned with the ability of family members 
to continue to provide care for persons with intellectual disabilities, 
they completely overlooked their autonomy as individuals and their 
right to live as full a life as possible.  As a result of our misplaced 
focus, we have been placing these individuals in permanent, plenary 
guardianships for decades, based almost entirely on diagnoses in two 
cursory physician affidavits.  Article 17A does not provide individuals 
with intellectual disabilities with appropriate due process protections 
and safeguards—either prior to or following the appointment of a 
guardian. 
Even after a series of guardianship reforms across the country and 
the enactment of Article 81 in New York—which does provide a 
variety of protections for individuals with intellectual disabilities—
Article 17A remains an option.  Additionally, we have neglected to 
reevaluate Article 17A despite the evidence that Article 17A 
guardianships often result in a loss of autonomy, abuse, and have the 
potential to deprive individuals of their constitutional due process 
rights. 
It has been twenty-five years since we set out, and failed, to reform 
Article 17A.  2015 was also the twenty-fifth anniversary of the 
passage of the ADA, which Article 17A arguably violates.  There is 
no better time than now to revisit Article 17A and either repeal the 
statute entirely or substantially reform it to provide appropriate 
protections for individuals with intellectual disabilities. 
